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The Historical Past and the
Dramatic Present
Toward a Pragmatic Clarification of Historical Consciousness
Vincent Colapietro
“The stone the builders rejected has become the
head of the corner[stone].”1 
Max H. Fisch
 
Introduction: An Exemplary Engagement with
Intellectual History
1 The aim of this paper is to show the depth to which C. S. Peirce, as a philosopher,  was
guided by his engagement with history and to clarify pragmatically what history means
in this connection. This engagement prompted him to do original historical research and
also reflect on historiographical practices.  This work was truly exemplary.  While this
topic  has  hardly  been  ignored,2 it  calls  for  much  fuller  exploration  than  it  has  yet
received. This is especially true since Peirce’s understanding of history itself calls for
more careful consideration, far more probing than it has yet received. As necessary as it
is to explore the place of history in his classification of the sciences, this is not sufficient.
This essay is designed to complement studies focusing on the conception of history to be
obtained from an exploration of that scheme.
2 Its main focus is on a pivotal but implicit distinction, the distinction between historical
knowledge and consciousness. Peirce came very early in his life to see the attainment of
historical knowledge and, more generally, of knowledge in all fields of scientific inquiry
in the context of reflexive consciousness: his thought encompassed an awareness of the
historicity  of  these  pursuits  and,  moreover,  the  most  salient  implications  of  their
essentially historical character. This distinction is however related to another crucial one,
that between an abstract definition and a pragmatic clarification of the historical past.
Here as elsewhere Peirce’s pragmatism does not compromise his realism: when abstractly
defined, the past stands in irreducible otherness to the present, but when pragmatically
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clarified, it is what experimental inquirers might more or less reliably reconstruct on the
basis of such historical evidence as monuments, documents, and other traces of the past.
Pragmatically  defined,  the  historical  past  is,  in  its  most  rudimentary  sense,  the
discoverable  past  (both  that something  had  taken  place  and  what had  assumed  a
determinate,  discoverable  form in the flux of  history).  As  such,  it  is  to  some extent
intelligible  (e.g.,  whatever  its  significance,  Stonehenge  is  a  human  artifact,  not  a
geological formation, and in principle its functions or significance are discoverable). In its
more refined forms, however, the pragmatic clarification of the historical past pushes
beyond historical knowledge and drives toward historical consciousness: experimental
inquirers thereby acquire a more or less explicit awareness of the historical drama in
which they are implicated agents. Such agential awareness is what I mean by historical
consciousness.
3 Peirce’s understanding of history is indeed subtle, nuanced, and in no small  measure
elusive. It is bound up with virtually all of his most important doctrines, most notably, his
realism, pragmatism, commonsensism, and synechism. In this paper, however, I cannot
even approximate doing justice to all of these linkages. For my purpose, Peirce’s realism
and pragmatism are at the focus of our exploration, but consideration of his synechism
(or doctrine of continuity), however brief, is necessary. The past, as past, is continuous
with the present. What is no longer actual in the strongest possible sense (haecceity) is
nonetheless real and, moreover, even actual in an attenuated sense. In his lexicon, reality
is not synonymous with actuality (or haecceity). The real is what would disclose itself in
the fullness of time, whereas the actual is what exerts itself here and now (Boler 1963: 51,
58; Short 2007: 86-7, 50, 70-8).3 In particular, the actuality of the past is, for Peirce at least,
just that – an instance of actuality. But the actuality of the past stands in marked contrast
to the actuality  (or  haecceity)  of  the present.  Finally,  our  knowledge of  the past  can
contribute to a “historical sense” in the living present. Because this is an agential sense,
one acquired and developed by agents caught up in the flux of historicity, it is ineluctably
a dramatic sense. The perspective of agents, implicated in evolved and evolving practices,
the outcomes of which hang in the balance,  becomes in part that of a self-conscious
participant in an unfolding drama (cf. CP 7.572). This sense is nonetheless tied but not
reducible  to  such knowledge.  Hence it  is  necessary to  distinguish between historical
knowledge and historical consciousness (or imagination). There is,  on the one hand, the
knowledge obtained by historical actors and, on the other, the awareness on the part of
such  actors  of  the  nature  of  their  undertaking.  These  are  distinct  yet  ultimately
inseparable.
4 The  principal  task  of  this  paper  is,  hence,  to  draw  the  requisite  distinctions  for
understanding  the  most  important  features  of  Peirce’s  distinctive  vision  of  human
history, above all, the one just formulated. Only by drawing these various distinctions can
we begin to comprehend the depth and character of this vision. For this purpose, none is
(to repeat) more important than that between historical knowledge and consciousness.
No denigration of the hard-won knowledge of the past is implied here. Just as imagination
(at  least  the  strictly  scientific imagination)  needs  to  be  tempered  and  tutored  by
experience, so too experience needs to be continually recontextualized and illuminated
by imagination.  Let us now consider in greater detail  the distinction around which I
allege everything turns.
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The Craft of Historical Inquiry and the Cultivation of
Historical Consciousness
5 Peirce’s engagement with the writing of history began in his youth. At twelve years of
age, he undertook the study of chemistry and, several years later, the task of writing a
history of  that  science (Fisch 1986:  403;  also his  Introduction to W 1:  xxvii-xix).  This
trajectory turned out to be a definitive tendency in his intellectual life (Eisele 1979: esp.
Ch. 3, 7, and 10; Fisch 1986: Ch. 20, esp. 385-9).4 He very early forged the conviction that
nothing is fully intelligible apart from the history in which the story of how it arose and
evolved is detailed. He was not fixated on origins, but focused on the entire course of
typically  ongoing  developments  (cf.  Peirce  1966:  403).  This  lifelong  conviction
encompassed a disciplined desire not only to acquire accurate knowledge of past deeds,
but also to attain a nuanced consciousness of the historicity of our diverse undertakings.
The accuracy of this knowledge was, in the end, arguably slightly less important than the
liveliness  of  this  consciousness.  But  this  does  not  carry  any  disparagement  of  the
demanding task of obtaining reliable knowledge of past events. It only means that the
imaginative venture of deepening historical consciousness is of overarching importance.5 
6 Shortly after being led by his study of chemistry to assembling a history of that science,
Peirce  by  accident  caught  a  glimpse  of  the  science  that  would  enthrall  him for  the
entirety of his life. To Victoria Lady Welby Peirce late in his life wrote:
Know that from the day when at the age of twelve or thirteen I took up, in my elder
brother’s room a copy of [Richard] Whately’s Logic, and asked him what logic was,
and getting some simple answer, flung myself on the floor and buried myself in it, it
has never been in my power to study anything […] except as a study of semeiotic […
] (Peirce 1966: 408)
7 In 1861, he wrote as the last entry of his class-book: “No longer wondered what I would do
in life but defined my object.” That object was logic, eventually re-envisioned as a general
theory of signs, inclusive of a normative account of inquiry (Ransdell 2000: 342). Even
when he was investigating topics by which he was inherently fascinated, he was also
studying them for sake of deepening his understanding of logic, that is, the working of
signs. 
8 As illuminating as this revelation is, it is likely to be misleading. For even before this,
another tendency, indeed a complementary one, had taken root: from very early in his
intellectual  development,  it  was  never  in  his  power  to  study  anything,  including
semeiotic (of the theory of signs), except historically. His propensity to study whatever
captivated his interest in light of  semeiotic was from the beginning conjoined to his
propensity to consider everything in light of history (Colapietro 2004).
9 His first public address, given November 12, 1863, was entitled “The Place of Our Age in
the History of Civilization” (Peirce 1966: Ch. 1). At the height of his maturity, he published
an essay appearing in the New York Evening Post (January 12,  1901) as “Review of  the
Nineteenth Century” and in the Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution (Washington,
D. C.,  1901)  as  “The  Century’s  Great  Men  in  Science.”  He  concludes  this  piece  by
suggesting, “To an earlier age knowledge was power, merely that and nothing more.” In
his own time, however, the pursuit of knowledge had become not only a way of life6 but
also  “the  summum  bonum.”  “Emancipation  from  the  bonds  of  self,  of  one’s  own
prepossessions, importunately sought at the hands of the rational power before which all
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must ultimately bow – this is,” Peirce contends, “the characteristic that distinguishes all
the  great  figures  of  the  nineteenth-century  century  from  those  of  former  periods”
(Peirce 1966: 274).
10 His thoroughgoing identification with the leading figures in this historical development,
pragmatically,  means  a  dramatic  sense  of  his  personal  participation  in  an  ongoing
dialogue, that is, a sense of his role in this drama.7 In this context, it is appropriate to
recall  his  numerous  efforts  to  draft  a  finely  detailed  history  of  scientific  inquiry,
stretching back before the ancient Greeks and driving forward to the cutting edge of his
historical moment. The fledgling chemist who undertook the task of writing the history
of chemistry matured into a philosophical historian who indefatigably researched the
historical  antecedents  to  his  contemporary  world,  especially  the  dramatic
transformations due to scientific inquiry (again see Eisele, also Fisch). The lessons to be
drawn  from  the  history  of  science  were,  as  much  as  anything  else,  lessons  for
philosophers (cf. CP 5.364). Peirce was confident that, in time, they would prove to be
invaluable in assisting honest philosophical inquirers to re-envision nothing less than the
very nature of their undertaking, including that of logic (and logic as semeiotic).8
11 Regarding this, he was anything but a spectator. He was self-consciously an agent who
took himself  to be responsible,  in some measure,  for  the development of  a  practice.
Accordingly,  a dramatic sense of  his intellectual  obligations animated and guided his
orientation toward the past and also his involvement in the disputes of his own day, not
least of all, the dispute between the progeny of the scholastic realists and the offspring of
the  Renaissance  humanists.9 In  brief,  his  understanding  of  the  past  fostered  a
consciousness of his role in a drama. More than anything else, this is what I mean by
historical consciousness as distinct from historical knowledge. This is a distinction, not a
dichotomy or dualism. Peirce was convinced that the reality of the past was, to some
extent, discoverable. He was unquestionably a realist, not a skeptic or what is commonly
called a constructivist.  But he was also a pragmatist.  Whatever reality (including the
reality of the past) means must be spelled out in terms of habits of conduct bearing upon
the future. Part of the difficulty is giving equal weight to both the realist and pragmatist
facets of his thought, another part showing how they are anything but incompatible. 
12 It would be hard to exaggerate the extent to which Peirce was committed to approaching
logic, science, and any topic of interest to him from the hard-won perspective of detailed
historical  knowledge.  Such  a  perspective  however  fosters  what  W. B. Gallie  calls
“historical imagination” (1968: 146). Even more than this perspective flowing from such
imagination, it flows into more developed, explicit, and nuanced forms of this singular
heuristic capacity. Such imagination is dramatic by virtue of being historical,  since it
fosters a sense of one’s fateful entanglement in an ongoing history. 
13 In one of his most detailed contributions to intellectual history (his extended review of
Fraser’s critical edition of Berkeley’s collected writings), Peirce considers his own time in
contrast to Berkeley’s: “the minds from whom the spirit of the age emanates have now no
interest in the only problems that metaphysics ever pretended to solve” (EP 1: 84) – God,
freedom, and immortality. Moreover, the “few who do now care for metaphysics are not
of that bold order of mind who delight to hold a position so unsheltered by the prejudices
of  common sense  as  that  of  the  good bishop” (EP 1:  84).  That  is,  these  few in  their
metaphysics hew closely to these prejudices. “As a matter of history, however, philosophy
[including metaphysics]  must  always  be  interesting” (emphasis  added),  even to  anti-
metaphysical minds. What he goes on to claim is even more pertinent to our purpose: the
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history of philosophy “is the best representative of the mental development of each age.
It  is  so  even  of  ours, if  we  think  what  really  is  our  philosophy.”  But  this  facet  of
development  needs  to  be  considered  in  conjunction  with  other  ones.  “Metaphysical
history  is,”  Peirce  insists,  “one  of  the  chief  branches  of  history,  and  ought  to  be
expounded side by side with the history of society, of government, and of war; for in its
relations with these we trace the significance of events for the human mind” (EP 1: 84). 
14 Unlike most philosophers, however, Peirce’s understanding of history is in accord with
the practice of historians, at least, those committed to testing their hypotheses about the
past  by  means  of  the  traces  of  that  past  (e.g.,  monuments,  documents,  and  other
empirical  evidence).  Professional  philosophers  seem  to  have  difficulty  expounding
intellectual history and, more narrowly, philosophical history in a manner that would be
recognizable to the historian as history. Part of this is that too little care is given to
evidence, part also that too little attention is paid to what historians and those other than
philosophers have written about the topics under consideration. In these respects, Peirce
distinguished himself from such philosophers. In reference to history no less than to, say,
physics,  chemistry,  or  biology,  the outward clash of  relevant  experience possessed a
critical relevance (Viola 2015). What William James wrote in a letter to his brother Henry
in reference to psychology was, in Peirce’s judgment, true of any form of inquiry: “I have
to forge every sentence in the teeth of irreducible and stubborn facts.” Of course, these
facts are not data. They must themselves be painstakingly established. They must also be
imaginatively envisioned.  The inquirer  “can stare stupidly at  phenomena;  but  in the
absence of imagination they will not connect themselves in any rational [or intelligible]
manner” (CP 1.46). To look at phenomena intelligently means, for Peirce, looking at them
imaginatively or “fancifully.”10 This is as true of the historian as any other inquirer. What
makes Peirce’s lifelong engagement in intellectual history so exemplary is that, unlike
most philosophers, he possessed an interior sense of the demanding craft of historical
inquiry.
15 To study anything historically, in Peirce’s judgment, did not mean simply or even
primarily tracing that thing to its origin, but detailing the still  unfolding drama of a
continually renewed endeavor (e.g., the endeavor wherein a generation just coming into
its own renews the undertaking of preceding generations, such as we witness in the case
of sciences such as physics, chemistry, or indeed history itself). However it might be with
their counterparts in physics or chemistry, virtually all contemporary historians possess
a working sense of the historical development of their intellectual vocation. Chemists
without much knowledge of  the history of  their  own science are hardly exceptional,
whereas historians ignorant of Herodotus, Thucydides, and other practitioners of their
craft would be. 
16 In any event, Peirce was in his time rather exceptional in his devotion to cultivating,
precisely  as  a  conscientious  participant  in  experimental  inquiry,  a  historical
consciousness of his passionate engagement in various scientific fields (Esposito 1984;
Viola 2015).  Such consciousness is not the same as knowledge of the history of these
fields, though it is unattainable apart from such knowledge. In the sense intended here,
such consciousness designates, above all else, a sense of the past in its bearing on the
present. Insofar as this is different, it also designates a sense of the present as derived
from the past. Moreover, it includes the recognition that this sense itself is through and
through historical: it does not pretend to imply a perspective above or beyond history.11
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17 This consciousness is, nevertheless, critical for agential self-understanding and critical in
a twofold sense. Historical consciousness is, for an agent caught up in an endeavor such
as parenting, teaching, or inquiring, crucial or indispensable. It is, moreover, critical in
the sense that history provides both invaluable resources for attaining a critical distance
from present preoccupations and securing possible criteria for judging contemporary
performances. In this sense, history in the service of life (even simply the life of the
craftsperson) is critical in the sense identified by Nietzsche. In brief, one of the uses of
history is to foster a critical sensibility. Though it does not necessarily do so, historical
consciousness can function as critical consciousness (cf. Trilling 2008: 196): a sense of the
past in its bearing on the present can enliven and emancipate those devoted to making
something significant and memorable of the present. In its ability to accomplish this, the
historical sense “is to be understood as the critical sense, as the sense which life uses to
test  itself”  (Trilling 2008:  196).  It  is  the sense which life  also  uses  to  transform and
transcend itself, that is, modify its inherited or habituated forms of striving. In other
words, history here is pressed into the service of self-overcoming.
18 The  craft  of  the  responsible  historian  is  one  thing,  the  cultivation  of  historical
consciousness  quite  another,  even  if  the  cultivation  of  such  consciousness  is  hardly
possible  apart  from what  only  can be  accomplished by  the  painstaking discipline  of
detailed  memorialization.  There  is,  in  the  foreground of  Peirce’s  preoccupation with
history, critical attention to the distinctive methodology of historical inquiry (i.e., to how
historians as inquirers into the past can most responsibly and effectively carry out their
task). He includes history in his classification of the sciences and its locus in this scheme
provides insights into what he takes history to be (see, e.g., Peirce CP 1. 272; also Miller
1971  and 1972;  and  Esposito  1983:  esp.  156-7).  But  history  is  more  than a  narrowly
delimited  field  of  experimental  inquiry.12 It  is  also  an  indefinitely  expansive
consciousness of any human endeavor, attainable by participants in the endeavor. That is,
there is, in the background of Peirce’s fascination with history, the deliberate cultivation
of historical consciousness, an awareness of one’s role in the drama in which one is so
fatefully entangled (see, e.g., CP 7.572; and Colapietro 2016). From his perspective, agents
ought  to  cultivate  such consciousness,  principally  for  the  sake  of  acquiring  a  fuller,
deeper sense of their own agency and, indeed, also a candid, contrite sense of the limits of
that agency.
 
First Steps toward a Pragmatic Clarification of the
Historical Past
19 At this juncture, however, I want to highlight another distinction, indeed, one of the most
basic distinctions in all of Peirce’s philosophical writings, one drawn at least as early as
1878 and deployed with varying degrees of consistency ever afterwards. It is at the center
of  Peirce’s  effort  to  close  or,  at  least,  reduce  the  distance  between  our  theoretical
understanding of logical procedure (logica docens) and the working logic (logica utens) of
the most successful inquirers. It is attempt to make explicit, in the form of a maxim, what
inquirers tend to do in their efforts to render their efforts experimental. That is,  the
logica utens of the most successful sciences ought to inform our logica docens (part of the
task of the latter being to make more explicit than we have yet done the former). If our
logica docens is to move toward catching up with our logica utens, we must move beyond
abstract definitions and insist upon pragmatic clarifications. As it turns out, however,
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pragmatic clarification in its most rudimentary form needs itself to be supplemented by
such clarification in ever more refined, reflexive forms. In particular, the dispositional
properties of inquiring subjects need themselves to be made explicit, indeed, the foci of
criticism, not just the dispositional properties of investigated objects. To take a simple
example, “hardness” is pragmatically clarified when it is conceived as how a substance
would behave in reaction to certain operations (e.g., being scratched by a diamond). This
is  however only one half  of  the story,  for  how experimental  inquirers,  as  deliberate
agents,  ought  to  comport  themselves  in  the  context  of  inquiry  is  also  critical.  The
dispositions of experimental investigators call for critical attention as much as those of
the experimental objects and events being investigated. These dispositions range from
very  simple  operations  (e.g.,  submerging  litmus  paper  in  a  liquid  and  observing
specifically how the paper is disposed to react to such submergence) to formally reflexive
habits (e.g., the disposition to attend with the most painstaking care the manner in which
an experiment was conducted and, beyond this, the disposition to imagine one’s specific
line of research as a contribution to a vast network of analogous endeavors). 
20 In Peirce’s judgment, traditional logic had not caught up to the best practices of the most
successful  investigations.  The degree  of  clarity  demanded in  such investigations  was
higher than those formally acknowledged by logicians (those who ought to provide a
normative account of objective inquiry). The famous pair of “claire et distincte” translated
into practice to mean tacitly familiar and formally defined. Even apart from the ability to
define the word triangle, one might know how to use this word in countless contexts and
such ability embodies a rudimentary level of conceptual clarity (it shows that one has
grasped,  in  however  indistinct  a  manner,  what  the  term  means  by  being  able,  for
example, to grasp what others mean when they use it). Abstract definition provides a
higher grade of  conceptual  clarity.  And traditional logic has rested content with the
attainment provided by such formal distinctness.
21 In  Peirce’s  judgment,  however,  tacit  familiarity  and  abstract  definition  need  to  be
supplemented by pragmatic clarification. The practice of inquiry suggests as much, as
does the attempt to draw out some of the implications from Alexander Bain’s definition of
belief  (Fisch  1986:  Ch. 5).  Bain’s  definition  of  belief,  as  that  upon which a  person is
prepared to act (see, e.g., Peirce CP 5.12), is an improvement upon Locke’s suggestion, “I
have always thought that the actions of men are the best interpreters of their thoughts.”
For actions might be taken to mean simply that which takes place hic et nunc, rather than
that which is expressive of a purpose or indicative of a habit.13 The “dumb” smarts of
competent agents and the formal definitions of those careful inquirers who desire to
draw distinctly the boundaries of what they are investigating are indispensable tools. But
the practice of inquirers reveals the need to translate their concepts into habits of action,
on both  sides  –  the  side  of  the  object  being  investigated  (How is,  for  example,  salt
disposed  to  act  when  immersed  in  a  liquid  such  as  water?)  and  that  of  the  agent
undertaking the investigation. Only by doing so will we effectively break out of the circle
of words and expose our claims to the rough-and-tumble world of experience (cf. Short
2007: 56-9); only then do we adequately learn what in the course of experience counts
against our claims and attributions, only then are objects granted their dialogical right to
be what their name implies (for only then are they in a position to object).14 
22 It is surprising that even some of the most informed and insightful scholars still all too
infrequently  use  this  simple  and  fundamental  distinction,  one  explicitly  and  indeed
repeatedly drawn by Peirce, as an interpretive key to his philosophical writings. This is
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even true in the case of their treatment of such topics as his account of science, definition
of semiosis, and stance on realism, though Peirce illustrates the meaning of his maxim (to
some degree,  the practical  import of  the pragmatic maxim itself)  by recourse to the
concept of reality. It must however be acknowledged that Peirce himself is part of the
problem,  since  he  not  infrequently  fails  to  push his  thought  on a  topic  beyond the
intermediate level of abstract definition. Consider, for example, the character of so many
of his definitions of sign or semiosis. At least on the surface, these appear to be abstract
definitions. Though he explicitly warns us to be on our “guard against the deceptions of
abstract definitions” (CP 7.362), he trades rather freely in such definitions. So many of his
expositors have been themselves deceived by this tendency on Peirce’s own part, or so it
seems to me.  At  his  best,  however,  Peirce is  at his  most  pragmatic and,  at  his most
pragmatic, he is committed to translating his thought about any topic whatsoever into
habits of action.15
23 We can ascertain the full force of the pivotal distinction between abstract definition and
pragmatic clarification only by seeing it as part of a trichotomy (tacit familiarity, formal
definition, and pragmatic clarity). What we need to become clear about is the reality of
the past, on the one hand, and our more or less reliable knowledge and, beyond this, our
dramatic consciousness of that reality, on the other hand. I however resist identifying
these two facets of our concern as the ontology and epistemology of history, because
questions regarding such knowledge are, in the spirit of Peirce’s project, better identified
as methodological than as epistemological (Ransdell 2000: 348-50). The point is that the
possibility of such knowledge is not in question. Here as much as anywhere else (if not
more than most other contexts), we ought not to pretend to doubt in our philosophy
what we do not doubt in our hearts (CP 5.265). And we do not – in certain respects, we
cannot – practically doubt either the reality of the past or our knowledge of that reality.
Indeed, every form of our knowledge is in some manner and measure historical. If we did
not possess a more or less reliable sense of what we have done and what has befallen us
(above all, what has befallen us as a consequence of how we have comported ourselves (cf.
Dewey, MW 10)), we would be precluded from knowing anything at all. The meaning of
our words (not least of all, the meaning of the word doubt) must be relatively steadfast if
we are to articulate our doubts, if these words are to be meaningful signs rather than
semantically empty sounds or squiggles. Hence, the stability of their meanings, however
relative  and  alterable,  in  effect  bears  testimony  to  the  reliability  of  memory.  The
continuity of unconscious, largely unacknowledged habits is much deeper than that of
our conscious, voluntarily conjured memories. Indeed, such memories depend, to a far
greater extent than we tend to appreciate, on such habits. 
24 Our beliefs, what we act or go on, are distillations of history, though in the case of innate
or  instinctual  dispositions,  they  are  distillations  not  of  our  personal  but  of  our
evolutionary history. The doubts indicative of the inadequacy of our beliefs are, in turn,
episodes in which history is manifestly “a-making” (CP 6.301). At the most rudimentary
level,  then, our “knowledge” of the past is unreflectively practical and almost wholly
tacit.  The  vast,  vague  background  upon  which  our  deliberative  rationality  draws  is
immeasurably vast and irreducibly vague.
25 For our purpose, what additionally merits notice is the distinction among three aspects of
the  past.  Confusion  will  result  if  we  fail  to  distinguish  the  past  in  its  indefinite
determinability, in its irreducible otherness, and in its fateful continuity. It must seem
contradictory  to  claim,  at  once,  that  the  past  is  indefinitely  determinable  and truly
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irrevocable. But this contradiction is apparent, not real. The past in its actuality – the
past in its secondness (I am disposed to say, simply, the past as past) – is irrevocable,
whereas  the  significance  of  the  past  is  determinable  in  ways  not  fixed  by  the
irrevocability of the past. For example, the significance of the outcome of the Civil War in
the  United  States  –  the  defeat  of  the  Confederacy  by  the  Union  –  did  not  mean,
irrevocably, the defeat of a country in which states’ rights were subordinate to federal
authority. Indeed, the decades after that war were ones in which the effective authority
of the federal government became or simply remained in crucial respects very limited. In
the  1950s,  President  Dwight  Eisenhower  was,  for  example,  reluctant  to  send  federal
troops into southern states to insure compliance with federal law (the desegregation of
schools in, for example, Little Rock, Arkansas).
26 The abstract definition of the reality of the past is one in which the secondness of the past
is foregrounded, whereas pragmatic clarifications tend to be ones in which some form of
thirdness is  rendered prominent.  This  runs strictly parallel  to what Peirce suggested
about reality simpliciter. Some might be inclined to argue this makes matters too simple.
But there is an advantage of beginning here and introducing greater complexity as fuller
attention to the relevant phenomena require or simply invite us to do. Lest the main
point is obscured or worse, lost entirely, let me stress the need to string the bow, by
bringing one end (that of irrevocability) close enough to the other (that of intelligibility
and, hence, of revisability) so that a sufficiently taut fiber can be put in place. It would be
hyperbolic to suggest that this task requires Herculean strength! But it  does demand
arduous or at least careful thought. 
27 A sufficiently  developed pragmatic  conception of  the  historical  past  includes  both  a
rudimentary  clarification  of  what  this  past  pragmatically  means  and  a  reflexive
understanding of the undertaking of the historical inquirer (i.e., the inquirer into what
has taken determinate,  discoverable form in the flux of  history).  This  either is  or  is
intimately akin to the pivotal distinction between historical knowledge and historical
consciousness. What the historical past pragmatically means is what historical inquiry is
destined to disclose. But what such inquiry itself most fundamentally means turns out to
require the cultivation of a reflexive, agential consciousness of both one’s role in such an
inquiry  and  the  role  of  such  an  endeavor  in  the  unfolding  drama  of  experimental
intelligence. Accordingly, a pragmatic clarification of historical consciousness requires
nothing  less  than  for  experimental  inquirers  to  conceive  themselves  as  deliberative
agents and, in turn, for such agents to conceive themselves as historical actors. For this
purpose, the deliberate control of conduct in a specific field of endeavor is necessary but
not sufficient. If we appreciate the implicit import of Peirce’s pragmatist stance, then
only a deliberately cultivated consciousness of one’s historical role in an unfolding drama
– an agential sense of the historical present – offers a sufficiently pragmatic clarification
of the historical past.
28 But this implication seems to work against what Peirce so indefatigably defends. The
development of historical consciousness can be made to look at odds with the attainment
of historical  knowledge.  The espousal of the ideal of objectivity can be made to look
inconsistent  with  the  actual  work  of  reconstructing  the  historical  past,  since  such
reconstruction is an instance of construction and,  as such,  seems to imply a form of
constructivism. Does not Peirce’s  thought,  in driving toward historical  consciousness,
undermine its own realistic aspirations, does not its acknowledgment of the historicity of
science undercut its commonsensism? Put yet otherwise, is not Peirce ultimately forced
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to  abandon  his  commitment  to  objectivism  in  favor  of  what  has  been called  a
transcendentalist perspective? Such questions turn out to be part of the historical record.
They have been pressed by one of the most insightful readers of Peirce’s entire oeuvre,
from the earliest juvenilia to the most mature writings.
 
Commonsensical Realism, Unconstrained
Constructivism, and Peircean Pragmatism
29 One of  the most erudite and penetrating expositors of Peirce has not only written a
critique of Peirce’s views regarding history (Esposito 1983, 1984) but also formulated in
detail his own subtle position regarding this thorny topic (Esposito 1984). In “Peirce and
the Philosophy of History” (1983), Joseph L. Esposito highlights an apparent tension in
Peirce’s largely implicit philosophy of the historical past. There is, he alleges, a tension
between a commonsensical understanding of the past and what he rather unfortunately
calls a “transcendental” approach. In Peircean terms, the former stresses the secondness
or objectivity of the past, whereas the latter emphasizes thirdness or intelligibility. In The
Transcendence  of  History:  Essays  on  the  Evolution  of  Historical  Consciousness (1984),  he
reiterates (though without reference to Peirce) his critique of “objectivism” or “realism”
but also presents his own account of history, one deeply indebted to Hegel but also to
Peirce (see especially 1984: 45, 165). It is accordingly surprising that, at least as far as I
know, no defender of Peirce has taken up the challenge implicit in this critique. Nor has
anyone assessed whether Esposito’s appeal to Peirce’s insights is justified (Is Peirce truly
an ally in articulating the approach to history championed by Esposito in his book?).
Hence, I want in this essay, among other tasks, to take up this challenge. My ultimate
objective in this section however is positive rather than critical, this goal being to work
toward attaining a pragmatic clarification of the historical past. But my proximate goal is
to show that Peirce’s views regarding this past are more coherent and defensible than
Joseph Esposito claims. In fairness, Esposito does not make a strong claim regarding any
fundamental incoherence in Peirce’s philosophy of history and he even suggests what I
take to be the most effective way of dispelling the appearance of such a flaw.
30 Esposito  does  however  claim  to  discern  a  tension  in  Peirce’s  treatments  of  history
between  an  objectivist  and  a  transcendentalist  (or  constructivist)  account.  This
distinction “corresponds roughly [I would urge, very roughly] to the common-sense
distinction between history as that which the historian studies and history as that which
the historian produces  [or  constructs]  from his  study”  (Esposito  1983:  156).  Esposito
significantly  frames  the  distinction  in  terms  of  consciousness.  For  the  objectivist,
“without a past to study [without the actuality or reality of temporally superseded events,
actions  and  structures]  there  would  be  no  historical  consciousness.”  For  the
constructivist, however, “without historical consciousness there would be no historical
past.”16 Esposito is disposed to ask, “Was Peirce an objectivist or transcendentalist?” In
other  words,  was  he  a  commonsensical  realist  regarding  the  historical  past  or  an
imaginative constructivist? Some passages imply a commitment to such realism, while
others suggest a leaning toward a form of constructivism. As it turns out, we must also
ask,  Are  these  the most  appropriate  or  illuminating terms by which to  identify  this
tension?
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31 Given Peirce varied remarks about the historical past and related topics, it is certainly no
surprise Esposito discerns disparate or even conflicting tendencies in Peirce’s writings.
But he does more than this. He suggests a way of possibly reconciling them. It would thus
be  very  instructive  here  to  recall  some  of  the  most  important  details  of  Esposito’s
nuanced interpretation of Peirce’s own subtle position. Another name for the objectivist
is realist (see Esposito 1984: 86-7), since the advocate of this position insists upon the
reality of the past. However much they might rely upon the techniques of literary fiction,
the practitioners of responsible historiography do not take themselves to be composing
fiction; they are deeply appreciative of the defining characteristics of historical narrative
vis-à-vis more freely fictive genres (e.g., purely novelistic narrative). Put more simply, the
constraints on the historian are greater than those on a novelist. This does not imply that
there are no constraints on a novelist, simply that they are quite different from those on
the historian.  While historical  facts,  like all  other ones,  are forged in the crucible of
painstaking  inquiry,  the  processes  by  which  they  are  forged  are  in  crucial  respects
different  from  those  of  more  purely  imaginative  authors  (cf.  Esposito  1984:  86-7).
Whether or not Pythagoras had a golden thigh is, for instance, a historical question (EP 2:
80), one more difficult to answer than we are likely to suppose. However much Hamlet
might be derived from, or based upon, historical figures, those figures as they appear in
this drama have been transfigured by Shakespeare’s literary imagination.
32 To return to a point broached earlier, Peirce goes so far as to insist, regarding anyone
desirous to discover the truth, “there is, after all, nothing but the imagination that can
ever supply him with an inkling of the truth” (CP 1.46). So, “after the passion to learn
there  is  no  quality  so  indispensable  to the  successful  prosecution  of  science  as
imagination” (CP 1.47). But Peirce is quick to point out: “There are, no doubt, kinds of
imagination  of  no  value  in  science,  mere  artistic  imagination,  mere  dreaming  of
opportunity for gain” (CP 1.48), that is, mere “practical” imagination. What distinguishes
scientific imagination from other kinds is that it “dreams of explanation and laws” (CP
1.48).  He  might  have  included  that  scientific  imagination  also  dreams  of  instituting
procedures by which the most rudimentary facts might be discovered (e.g., carbon dating
as a procedure by which to determine when life first appeared on Earth). Some sciences
are descriptive rather than nomothetic or, at least, far more descriptive than nomothetic.
Indeed, history, as a science, is one of them (see, e.g., CP 1.272). The discovery of facts and
laws depends to a far greater extent than we commonly realize on the exercise of the
imagination, though an imagination tempered and tutored by the exacting demands of
experimental  inquiry.  That  of  facts  alone  greatly  depends  on this.  For  example,  the
historical imagination of the painstaking historian is nowhere more evident in asking
what, immediately upon being posed, are “obvious” questions, yet they are the ones that
for lack of imagination have not been taken up (e.g., what were the everyday lives of
ordinary people during, say, the medieval epoch like?).
33 To  whatever  extent  this  might be  the  case,  the  realist  insists  upon  an  irreducible
difference between that which is independent of our thinking and that which depends on
our thinking.  Put  more simply,  the advocate of  realism refuses to erase entirely the
distinction between the real and the fictive. However fuzzy the boundaries might be, in
practice, in particular cases, they are, in principle, to be defended against the widely
influential rhetoric of unbridled constructivists. An historical account based on the best
available evidence is different from one grounded unduly in conjecture and speculation. 
The Historical Past and the Dramatic Present
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
11
34 It is however not enough to stress, as the objectivist or realist does, the reality of the past.
It is also necessary to identify what might be called the character of that reality,17 for the
historical  past  is  manifestly  different  from  the  historical  present,  though  both  are
undoubtedly  real.18 From  Peirce’s  perspective,  the  historical  present  is  marked  by
vagueness and generality to a far greater degree than the historical past. The actuality of
hinc et nunc is fundamentally different from that of having been (or having occurred or
taken place). The haecceity of the present is the paradigm of haecceity, whereas that of the
past is rather paradoxical. How could the past, as past, be here and now? An adequate
understanding of both the historical past and the historical present requires us to realize
that the past is not simply past. More accurately, the historical past is not in all respects
simply annihilated by the ceaseless self-annulment of the historical present. In annulling
itself, the cutting edge of the present cuts off the present from the past, the now from the
no longer. But there is more to this story than a tale of rupture, a drama of discontinuity.
19
35 The past is in some form there to be known, though this there turns out to be hard to
specify. To some extent, the past as past, the past as that which no longer exists in the
manner of the present, can be known. Like every other instance of reality, the reality of
the past is that which exists independent of what you or I or any other finite individual
happens to think about the past.  This  however calls for clarification.  At  the level  of
abstract definition, the reality of the past is identical in meaning to that of any other
object of inquiry. At the level of pragmatic clarification, however, the linkages of this
reality to thought, not its independence, need to be brought into focus. While the abstract
definition seeks to clarify the meaning of reality by highlighting the contrast between the
real and the  fictive,  the  difference  between reality  and the  vagaries  of  our  thoughts
regarding reality, pragmatic clarification foregrounds not only the link between reality
and intelligibility  but  also  the  processes  by  which the  possibilities  of  discovery  and
understanding are most effectively realized.
36 Before trying to show how these grades of clarity bear upon the meaning of history,
however, we must first clarify what Esposito takes to be, in contrast to the objectivist
stance,  the  constructivist  approach  to  human history.  The  word  history is  of  course
ambiguous.  It  might  designate  what  actually  happened  or the  attempt  to  record  or
discover what actually happened.  As Esposito puts it,  it  might mean “history as that
which the historian studies and history as that which the historian produces from his
study” (Esposito 1983: 156). It is however not simply a matter of emphasis. While the
objectivist is stressing the importance of attending to what actually happened and the
constructivist  the  necessity  of  acknowledging  the  extent  to  which  even  the  most
responsible historiographers are engaged in an imaginative reconstruction of a largely (if
not entirely) elusive past (cf. Miller 1981: 186), the difference between the two is more
than a difference in emphasis. To take an exemplar of objectivism, Leopold von Ranke
was not only focused on discovering in detail what actually happened but also scornful of
attempts by such thinkers as Hegel to interpret human history in terms of sweeping
claims (e.g., the whole of this history is, at bottom, the story of the struggle for freedom).
To take an exemplar of constructivism, R. G. Collingwood, a thinker who was in important
respects quite close to Hegel, the task of the historian is not so much to discover as it is to
re-enact the thoughts of the past. History is the drama of such re-enactment. The reality
of the historical past is,  for the objectivist,  something to be discovered, in a manner
closely akin to, if not identical with, the manner in which anything else is discovered
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(specifically, by the framing, testing, revising, and rejecting hypotheses).20 In contrast,
the  significance  of  the  historical  past  is,  for  the  constructivist,  something  to  be
constructed or created. What has actually happened derives its point and purpose from
how it focuses the energies and enlarges the imagination of agents in the present.  The
historical past is made up not of dead facts but of enlivening forces. For the constructivist
at least, history is not a meaningless sequence of “just one damn thing after another,” but
an intelligible series of intertwined developments. For the pragmatist, it is no less so.
37 A way out of this impasse can be glimpsed by tracing the implications of a claim made by
J. W. Miller.21 What he wrote about history helps us to grasp the most salient features of
what I am calling historical consciousness. He addressed these questions more explicitly
and directly than Peirce tended to do,  but his  approach was deeply akin to Peirce’s.
Hence, I am here appealing to his formulations. “One may, and [indeed] one must,” Miller
asserts, “allege that the concerns that animated Plato were not brought to completion”
(1981: 83) by him or any of his successors, including ourselves. Above all else, the crisis of
the polis at the center of Plato’s project, the ensemble of events to which his philosophy
is a response,22 did happen long along in another place than that in which we now dwell.
But,  at  the very least,  the reverberations  of  this  crisis  can be heard and felt  in  the
systematic failures of our political institutions. “We are,” as Miller so poignantly notes,
“the heirs not only of past wealth,  but also of past debits” (Miller 1981:  188).  Plato’s
“failure” to respond adequately to this crisis is not only his. It is also ours. Or, to take
another  example,  the  concerns  that  animated  the  pre-Socratics  in  their  efforts  to
envision the world of their experience as a cosmos were far from brought to completion
by their  labor or genius.  Despite the scientific  revolutions intervening between their
allegedly inaugural efforts and contemporary investigations, our efforts and theirs are
continuous.  Moreover,  ours  are  no  more  likely  to  be  brought  to  completion  in  the
millennia after us than were theirs. If this is so, we are not making or re-enacting the
thoughts of our predecessors but are renewing or simply prolonging their efforts to bring
to fuller realization their unfinished projects, without necessarily any hope of bringing
these  to  final  closure  or  definitive  completion.  We  consciously  join  some  specific
ancestors in some specific regard (e.g., Plato as a thinker whose project is bound up with
the history of Athens, especially as symbolized in the execution of Socrates) because we
discover, time and again, that we are fatefully enjoined to some inherited undertaking.
Our current crisis is the unwitting prolongation of an unresolved issue bequeathed to us
by historical figures from whom we can dissociate ourselves only by maiming our identity
and vitiating our agency. We no more invented science, philosophy, or politics than the
language we speak or the morals we enact,  not least of  all  revealing ourselves to be
inheritors, rather than creators, in our linguistic innovations or moral “transvaluations”
(cf. MacIntyre 2006).
38 Accordingly,  the  historical  past  is,  at  once,  continuous  with  the  past  (e.g.,  Plato’s
struggles to conceive the polis as a place in which justice might be effectively operative
are in effect taken up anew by succeeding generations) and discontinuous with that past
(no simple return is possible, since our time is in critical respects markedly different from
earlier times). Neither continuity nor disruption can be the final word. Both historical
knowledge and consciousness require a detailed, nuanced, and accurate understanding of
the respects in which history exemplifies the dialectic of continuity and disruption. 
39 The historical past is hence not so much given as won. We must work to achieve both
knowledge and consciousness of it. This can be construed as a form of constructivism, but
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given Peirce’s realism this is likely to be more misleading than accurate. In particular, the
form of  constructivism being advocated by Esposito  and attributed by him,  however
circumspectly, to Peirce is one in which the historical past is decidedly not created out of
whole cloth. It is, in addition, not sewn together from the merely disparate scraps from
exquisitely designed garments long ago torn asunder. It is rather an historical past with a
more or less determinate shape.23 It has such a shape, however, because it is the past
claimed  by  those  who  have  a  determinate  sense  of  their  present  identity  (e.g.,  an
understanding of themselves as participants in a specific field of scientific research or
citizens of a specific nation).
40 But what is so characteristic of his thought in other contexts is also discernible in Peirce’s
writings on history and allied topics. He is anxious to do just to reality, in particular, the
reality of history, lest we remove from under the feet of historians the ground on which
they so reasonably claim to stand. In a perfectly straightforward sense, then, the craft of
the historian is focused on what has taken place, even though we are never in a position
to perceive historical events or even, in most instances, not in a position to call upon the
living memory of direct witnesses who were at the time in the position to perceive them.
But historical knowledge even in this narrow sense hardly exhausts our concern with
history. Yet even in this narrow sense the thirdness and secondness, the intelligibility
and actuality (or “objectivity”), of history are of focal concern. Allow me to make this
point precisely in reference to Peirce. He self-consciously intervened in the history of
logic  for  the  purpose  of  re-orienting  the  science  of  logic,  desiring  to  recast  it  as  a
normative  theory  of  objective  inquiry.  The  deliberate  cultivation  of  historical
consciousness made this possible, so much so that his self-conscious intervention in this
ongoing history was inseparable from his historical consciousness of his specific locus in
the  actual  history  of  the  logical  theory.  Such  historical  consciousness  is  more  than
historical  knowledge.  Its  cultivation  points  beyond  objectivism  to  constructivism.
Esposito suggests, “as soon as one raises the question of the priority of the disciplines
among  each  other  [e.g.,  as  soon  as  one  considers  that,  say,  mathematics  and
phenomenology  are  prior  to  psychology  and history],  the  transcendental  perspective  of
historical consciousness enters the picture” (Esposito 1983: 161; emphasis added).24 In other
words, we supposedly need to go beyond history in order to ground our knowledge of
history (in a word, we need to go transcendental).  For reasons far from clear, Esposito
seems to  hold that  the  conditions  for  the  possibility  of  our  experimentally  acquired
knowledge of history are transcendental rather than “merely” historical. So, “instead of
looking upon history as  an objective human past,  ‘the past’  becomes a  metaphysical
category interpreted according to a particular category of modality called ‘actuality’ or
‘existence’” (Esposito 1983: 161). As a result, “‘history’ becomes the name for the living
theoretician’s construction of human memories, signs, and inferences” (Esposito 1983:
161).  Here I  imagine Peirce resisting Esposito’s  insistence on historical  consciousness
requiring a transcendental perspective and, moreover, history being a construct in any
sense opposed to realism.
41 But  Esposito  is  certainly  right  in  taking  “the  past”  to  be  either  a  category  or  a
phenomenon  to  which  Peirce’s  categories  was  applicable.  Regarding  history,  the
memories,  signs,  and  inferences  to  which  he  refers  are  unquestionably  instances  of
Thirdness  and,  as  such,  are  “not  literally  capable  of  existence  or  actuality.”  More
cautiously put, they are not capable of being fully or exhaustively embodied in actuality.
One  of  the  most  important  implications  of  this  constructivist  stance  toward  human
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history  is  that  the  actuality  of  the  irrevocable  past  is  not  allowed  to  eclipse  the
intelligibility  of  an  ongoing  history.  To  do  justice  to  history,  both  the  irrevocable
actuality  (the  past  as  a  fully  determinate  domain  of  fait  accompli)  and  the  alterable
significance of the historical past need to be fully given their due.
42 The  tension  identified  by  Esposito  is  hardly  a  contradiction.  Peirce  might  be
characterized as both an objectivist and a constructivist, but it would be, in my judgment,
better to identify him as a realist and a pragmatist (even better, as a pragmatic realist).
And  his  own  pragmatism  enables  us  to  see  how  fully  these  apparent  rival  stances
complement rather than preclude one another. At the level of abstract definition, the
past – better, the reality of the past – designates a rather paradoxical form of haecceity. At
the level of pragmatic clarification, however, it points to an equally paradoxical feature of
the past – its revisability (not merely the revisable character of our “knowledge” of the
historical past, but also the alterable significance of the irrevocable past itself). One of the
paradoxes of the past is that its having been and hence its being no longer are what it is
and what will remain ever afterwards. The actuality of the past can no more be gainsaid
than that of the present, though the actuality of fait accompli is not the same as that of
what exists here and now (that which in the present crowds out a place for itself (CP 
1.432)).
43 The principal task of the historical inquirer is to discover, on the basis of evidence, the
actuality and reality of the past. This is as true of the intellectual historian as any other
kind of  historian.  But  this  task relies  as  much as  anything else,  save the passion to
ascertain  the  truth,  on  imagination  (CP 1.46).  It  is  not  only  rooted  in  historical
imagination but also blossoms into various forms of this intellectual flora. The growth of
a plant is partly the result of an ongoing interaction between the internal structure of the
plant and the environing conditions, including light emanating from a star over ninety
million miles away. So, too, is that of historical consciousness or imagination.25 It is truly
the consequence of a dialogue, multifaceted and multileveled.
 
Human History: The Ongoing Dialogue with an
Irrevocable Yet Revisable Past
44 The past addresses us in a language we barely understand, if we do indeed comprehend
its modes of articulation at all.26 There are far too many cases where our most focused,
sustained, and ingenious efforts have been frustrated to encourage unbridled confidence
in our ability to divine even the most rudimentary facts about the historical past. But,
then, there are too many instances in which we have been successful in our efforts to
make sense out  of  the perceptible  traces  of  the historical  past  to warrant  wholesale
skepticism regarding historical knowledge.
45 Let us however recall here what Peirce suggests in a passage having no explicit link to
historical knowledge. “Some [signs] address themselves to us, so that we fully apprehend
them [as signs]. But it is a paralyzed reason that does not acknowledge others that are not
directly addressed to us, and that does not suppose still others of which we know nothing
definitely” (NEM IV: 299). The traces of the past are among the most prominent of signs
not addressed to us,27 but ones availing access to facets of what is no longer extant. It
would indeed be a paralyzed reason that was unable to imagine the ubiquitous possibility
of  historical  traces  and,  moreover,  one  that  was  unable  to  generate  reasonable
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conjectures  about  at  least  the  historical  past  in  its  roughest  outlines  (e.g.,  from the
evidence available to us at the site of this dig, there appears to have been a cluster of
dwellings adjacent to one another and, in addition, structures possibly serving functions
other than shelter or dwelling, perhaps temples or, more cautiously, what would be in
this culture the analogue of such a building). 
46 The allegedly simple fact of there having been, at this site, such a village or assemblage of
dwellings is itself noteworthy. Beyond this, however, there might be clues regarding the
form of life made possible in part by this cluster of structures. Even the most rudimentary
of historical facts are necessarily neither dead nor deadening (cf. Esposito 1983: 157-60;
Esposito  1984:  141).  They  might  be  lively  and  enlivening.  When  they  prove  to  be,
historical  “knowledge,”  even  when  it  turns  out  to  be  erroneous,  fosters  historical
consciousness, dramatic identification with almost always anonymous agents far removed
from contemporary life.28
47 The paintings on the wall of a cave disclose to us those engaged in a form of life akin to
our  own,  even  if  we  have  not  yet  been  able  to  ascertain  the  significance  of  those
paintings.29 Our  encounter  with  them almost  certainly  enlivens  our  imagination and
holds our interest, prompting us to ask, Who were the people who crafted these images?
What were they, in terms of their self-understanding,30 doing when they were pictorially
using pigments to capture these animals? Even the most remote ancestors are ancestors,
even  the  most  enigmatic  utterances  are  utterances  and,  almost  certainly,  also
enactments.
48 The exacting “price of a historical past is,” as Miller notes, “a historical present” (Miller
1981: 179). The fixed present is however anything but an historical present. Where there
is a fixed past, it is in the interest of a fixed present, so that one ‘is’ of a certain race or
creed or nation, not that one could become so [or cease to be so], not that the past was
also a becoming in its own time and place” (Miller 1981: 179-80). As the title of Octavio
Paz’s Nobel Lecture implies, we have to go in search of the present and, to a degree we
could  never  have  anticipated,  this  search  drives  us  deeply  and  intimately  into  the
historical past (the past as both that which itself became in its own time and place and
that with which many of our simplest acts (e.g., our acts of speaking and gesturing) are
inexorably bound up.31
49 The exacting price of an historical present is an historical past. We can no more have an
historical present without an historical past than we can have an historical past without
an  historical  present.  Again,  let  us  take  Peirce  as  an  example  of  this  point.  As  a
philosopher of science, Peirce felt compelled to make himself into a historian of science.
Undoubtedly, he was inherently fascinated by history, but his painstaking engagement in
the imaginative reconstruction of the historical drama in which his most noteworthy
predecessors and contemporaries strove to carry forward the groundbreaking work of
the  ancient  logicians  was  rooted  in  more  than  this  fascination.  It  derived  from his
passionate involvement in this unfinished drama. That is, his present concern required
the careful cultivation of his historical consciousness. But, then, the historical past, when
candidly  acknowledged  as  a  fateful  inheritance,  demands  a  historical  present.  For
example, the failure of our forebears to fulfill their tasks imposes upon us, here and now,
the need to take up those tasks. For instance, the failure of Reconstruction after the Civil
War in the United States is not simply that of those who were living in the decades after
that horrific conflict. It defines the citizens of this country still. Speaking as an American,
one  must  acknowledge  that  their failure  is  yet  ours.  So,  a  historical  past  demands  a
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historical present no less than a historical present demands a historical past (as much as
anything, the conscientious cultivation of historical consciousness). To go in search of the
present ineluctably leads to the ruins of the past (Paz 1991). Such ruins are however part
of the landscape of the present. To know where we presently stand, thus, requires us to
see what constitutes the contours of this landscape, not least of all these ruins, but also
the intricate designs they intimate and epochal energies they indicate.
 
Conclusion: The Unfolding Drama of Historical
Imagination
50 “The nature of history,” Erik Erikson predicted over fifty years ago, “is about to change.”
He  was  practically  certain  that:  “It  cannot  continue  to  be  the  record  of  high
accomplishments in dominant civilizations, and of their disappearance and replacement”
(Erikson  2000:  224).32 The  shared  fate  of  human  beings  demands  “new  ethical
alternatives” and, accordingly, a transfigured historical consciousness. 
51 History has indeed changed in our times, though not exactly in the manner identified by
Erikson. And it is bound to change just as profoundly time and again. There is no ahistoric
matrix in which historical processes unfold (Esposito 1984). And history is not a process
of  evolution  in  the  etymological  sense.  The  contexts  in  which  change  occurs  are
themselves changing. They are through and through historical as is our understanding –
hence, our relationship – to these contexts. A philosophy of history must be nothing less
than a philosophy of contexts (cf. Esposito 1984: 6), one in which the historical nature of
complexly related contexts is illuminated in its most salient details.  As it  historically
played out, the elevation of mathematics involved the denigration of history, despite the
ingenious efforts of such early critics of the Cartesian framework as Vico (Fisch 1986: Ch. 
11; and MacIntyre 2006). But, a century before Thomas Kuhn, Charles Peirce discerned
the relevance of history for an understanding of science and, indeed, for all else.
52 “The stone the builders rejected has become the head of the corner” (Fisch 1986: 214; cf.
MacIntyre  2006).33 And  this  has  been  accomplished  in  no  small  part  because  of  the
indefatigable and imaginative efforts  of  Peirce to give history its  due.  Only thus can
science  and  more  generally  signs  and  symbols  be  given  their due.  The  voluminous
writings  of  this  still  elusively  enigmatic  genius  are  in  effect  nothing  less  than
monumental testimony to this heuristic principle. They are indeed a dramatic instance of
monumental history in the Nietzschean sense, above all, because we encounter there, in
however compressed and thus elliptical a form, a compelling case for the historical past
as both an irrevocable actuality and an inescapable inheritance of unfinished tasks (also
broken promises and fateful evasions). The significance of the past is nearly as malleable
as the actuality of the past is unalterable. Since we are first and foremost agents caught
up in processes  and practices  for  the most  part  transcending our consciousness  and
control,  but  ones  in  which  our  interventions  and  innovations  are  often  far  from
inconsequential,  our present is  dramatic.  A guiding sense of  the historical  past  is  an
integral feature of deliberative rationality. Such rationality is deliberative by virtue of
being dialogical (cf. Bernstein 1992: 52). Signs are “the only things with which a human
being can, without derogation, consent to have any transaction” (CP 6.344). This includes
the monuments, documents, and other traces of the past.
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53 Our  dialogue  with  history  can  be  a  largely  unsuspected  farce  in  which  we  impose
contemporary categories on past forms of human life. For it can be one in which we are
not only unconsciously engaged but also one in which we obliviously commit the sin of
anachronism! But it can also be a gentle comedy in which our limitations, errors, and
shortcomings are revealed to us by our dramatic encounter with human beings whose
irreducible otherness, hence whose unassimilable modes, prove time and again critical
for assisting our self-understanding and self-overcoming.34 In brief,  our dialogue with
history is a process in which anachronism is hardly avoidable35 yet possibilities for self-
understanding and self-transformation are readily available. In his dialogue with his past,
however, Peirce strove to avoid anachronism (see, e.g., CP 7.181) and also to exploit these
possibilities.  In  our  dialogue  with  his  writings,  we  are  ineluctably  drawn  into  his
imaginative dialogue with the historical past. To read Peirce seriously is, indeed, to be
caught  up  in  the  unfolding  drama  of  human  fallibility,36 rendered  increasingly  self-
conscious,37 a  drama in  which  the  epoch-making  power  of  experimental  intelligence
emerges as a central  figure in the tragicomedy of  our age.  Hubris and the blindness
resulting from it are unquestionably part of the story of our time, but so too are those
revelatory yet comic episodes in which we realize just how foolish or stupid we have
been, though without causing much, if any, harm. In being drawn into his thought in this
manner, we are driven to place dramas of self-correction at the center of a life devoted to
self-overcoming (see, e.g., Peirce 1966: 274; CN I: 188-9; see also Colapietro 1989: 95-7).
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NOTES
1. Of course, Fisch is here invoking a metaphor found in Christian and indeed Hebrew scripture
(see,  e.g.,  Psalms,  113,  118;  Matthew 21,  41;  and Mark 12,  10).  My reason for attributing this
metaphor to him is, in this context, that he uses the image to suggest history, that which has
been thrown away by Descartes and countless other philosophers, provides Peirce with nothing
less than the corner stone of a philosophical edifice built for inhabitants of our historical time.
He does so, no doubt, with historical consciousness, as do I. But there is reason to make this
explicit. The image is scriptural, the use to which Fisch puts it however is the one most directly
relevant to this essay.
2. Significant steps toward such a clarification have already been taken by Willard Miller, Philip
Wiener, Joseph Esposito, Tullio Viola, Chiara Ambrosio, Daniel Brunson, and others. In gratitude
for their endeavors,  I  was disposed to use as my subtitle “Further Steps Toward a Pragmatic
Clarification of Historical Consciousness”! This however would have made a title already too long
and cumbersome even more so. But I am acutely conscious not only of the efforts of others but
also my indebtedness to their work and insights. This essay is indeed an enactment of what it
thematizes, a self-conscious endeavor to take up and carry forward a task already underway. 
3. Especially  in  its  ontological  deployment,  Peirce’s  concept  of  secondness  was  designed  to
capture  what  Scotus  intended  by  haecceity  (Boler  1963:  122,  164;  cf.  Bernstein  1971,  180-2).
Secondness signifies “not mere twoness [or duality] but active oppugnancy is in it” (CP 8.291). It is
that which is insistently and aggressively here and now – that which “blindly forces a place for
itself in the universe, or willfully crowds its way in” (CP 1.459). For this reason, Peirce discerns at
least  an  affinity  between  his  understanding  of  secondness and  the  Scotistic  recognition  of
haecceity.
4. Reading Peirce on the topic of history and indeed much else, I have learned much from those
who were already prominent when I took up the study of Peirce – in particular, Carolyn Eisele,
Max Fisch, Kenneth Ketner, Joseph Ransdell, T. L. Short, Lucia Santaella, Joseph Esposito – but I
have learned no less from those younger than me (most notably, David Agler, Chiara Ambrosio,
Daniel Brunson, Masato Ishida, and Tullio Viola).
5. In  “Philosophy  and  Civilization”  John  Dewey  writes:  “Significant  history  is  lived  in  the
imagination of man, and philosophy is a further excursion into its own prior achievements” (LW 
3: 5). This clearly implies not only that philosophy is an engagement with history but also that it
is an adventure of the imagination. Elsewhere he astutely observes: “From the human standpoint
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our study of history is still all too primitive. It is possible to study a multitude of histories, and
yet permit history,  the record of  the transitions and transformations of  human activities,  to
escape us” (MW 14: 78-9).
6. Science was, for Peirce, “a mode of life whose single animating purpose is to find out the real
truth,  which  pursues  this  purpose  by  a  well-considered  method,  founded  on  thorough
acquaintance with such scientific results already ascertained by others as may be available, and
which seeks cooperation in the hope that the truth may be found out, if not by any of the actual
inquirers [now engaged in its pursuit], yet ultimately by those who come after them and who
shall make use of their results” (CP 7.54, emphasis added).
7. His self-understanding conjoined an unabashed commitment to traditional Christianity with
an  acute  awareness  of  the  revolutionary  character  of  scientific  inquiry.  And  this  self-
understanding is expressly dramatic: “A man is capable of having assigned to him a rôle in the
drama of creation, and so far as he loses himself in that – not matter how humble it may be rôle, –
so far he identifies himself with its Author” (CP 7.572; Colapietro 2016). Peirce took himself to
have been assigned the role of scientist. As a result, inquiry was for him a form of worship and, in
turn,  worship  a  practice  in  which  the  growth  of  understanding,  above  all  else,  self-
understanding, was critical.
8. “Peirce was,” Joseph Ransdell properly notes, “a radical thinker, attempting to re-think and
re-establish logic at the most fundamental level, and it is appropriate [for us] to go back to the
beginnings of logic in the West to understand what this means” (2000: 342). This is so because
Peirce felt it was necessary for him to go back at least this far for the sake of executing this task.
9. The dispute between the realists and nominalists was, for Peirce, at bottom one regarding the
nature and indeed the possibility of community, hence, one regarding continuity (in particular,
the degree and forms of continuity between, or among, selves distant from one another, be it
historical or some other kind of distance).
10. Fancy and phantasy were often used in the nineteenth century as synonyms for imagination.
“Fancifully” hence might only refer to the exercise of imagination or,  rather misleadingly to
contemporary  ears,  “fancy.” While  Descartes  drew a  sharp distinction  between intellect  and
imagination,  Peirce  returned to  the  scholastic  position  (human intelligence  is  rooted  in  and
depends  on  our  imaginative  capacities).  The  poet  Alfred  Tennyson  wrote,  “maybe  wildest
dreams/Are but the needful preludes of the truth,” to which Peirce responds: “I doubt the word
maybe. Wildest dreams [or fancies] are the necessary first steps toward scientific investigation”
(Peirce 1966: 233).
11. Whatever perspective from which “history needs to be written [or simply imagined] if it is to
escape subjectivity, it seems that it, too, is, as J. W. Miller notes, a historical resultant. Thus the
one necessary point of view from which history is to be written [at present] is self the outcome of
history”  (Miller  1981:  188).  And,  for  the  person  engaged  in  this  task,  this  must  be  a  self-
consciously historical perspective. “The present is no Olympian height from which all history is
to be judged as from some timeless perspective” (Miller 1981: 188). Rather this present is,  to
repeat, historical through and through.
12. Of course, one cannot conduct experiments in history in the same manner as one can in, say,
physics or chemistry.
13. “Action is,” Peirce suggests,” second, but conduct is third” (CP 1.337). Action as that which
takes  place  here  and  now  is  an  instance  of  secondness,  and  hence  needs  to  be  clearly
distinguished from that which is bound up with generality (be in the generality of a purpose or
that of a habit or, of course, both, as is almost always the case). To avoid confusion, “action”
expressive or indicative of generality might be designated as conduct, manifestly an instance of
thirdness.
14. “Successful research,” Peirce suggests, “is conversation with nature; the macrocosmic reason,
the equally occult microscopic law, must act together or alternately, till the mind is in tune with
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nature” (CP 6.568). What such research facilitates is a finer and fuller attunement between the
habits of rational agents and the dispositions of the countless objects encountered in the course
of experience. “An experiment, says Stöckhardt, in his excellent School of Chemistry, is a question
put to nature. Like any interrogatory, it is based on a supposition. If that supposition be correct,
a certain sensible result is to be expected under certain circumstances which can be created, or
at any rate are to be met with. The question is, Will this be the result? If Nature replies ‘No!’ the
experimenter  has  gained  an  important  piece  of  knowledge.  If  Nature  says  ‘Yes,’  the
experimenter’s  ideas  remain  just  as  they  were,  only  somewhat  more  deeply  engrained”  (CP 
5.168).  “Experiment,  after  all,  is  an  uncommunicative  informant.  It  never  expiates:  it  only
answers ‘yes’ or ‘no’; or rather it usually snaps out ‘No!’ or, at best only utters an inarticulate
grunt for the negation of its ‘no’” (CP 5.428). Even so, there is much to be learned from these
inarticulate grunts!
15. “[O]f the myriad forms into which a proposition may be translated,” Peirce asks, “what is that
one which is to be called its very meaning? It is,  according to the pragmaticist,  that form in
which  the  proposition  becomes  applicable  to  human  conduct,  not  in  these  or  those  special
circumstances,  nor  when one entertains  this  or  that  special  design,  but  form which is  most
directly applicable to self-control under every situation, and to every purpose. This is why he
locates the meaning in future time; for future conduct is the only conduct that is subject to self-
control” (CP 5.427; see Colapietro 1999/2000).
16. John William Miller suggests, “where nothing is cherished nothing is found” (Miller 1981:
111).  What he immediately goes on to say is even more pertinent to our purpose:  “Now this
seems to be a matter of some weight, but likely to be passed over, or denied, in our factually
oriented  idiom.  For  to  cherish  requires  emotion  and  will.  If  there  are  to  be  memorials  [or
monuments]  they have to  be treated as  memorials.  There are no monuments  of  the past  as
matters of fact. […] There are no monuments in terms of the traditional epistemology of passivity
[that in which objects are given rather than constructed]. A past has to be actively treasured if it is to
be perceived as a past” (Miller 1981: 111, emphasis added).
17. This distinction is central to Esposito’s argument in “Peirce and the Philosophy of History”
(Esposito 1983). Insisting upon the reality of the past, as the objectivist or commonsensist does, is
understandable and even valid, but the task of clarifying the meaning of this reality cannot be
skirted. This is correct, but it hardly entangles Peirce in the difficulties that Esposito alleges. 
18. Of course, one might object that it is possible to doubt the reality of the past. “There is,”
Bertrand Russell proposed, “no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into
existence five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that ‘remembered’ a wholly
unreal  past.  There  is  no  logically  necessary  connection  between  events  at  different  times;
therefore,  nothing  that  is  happening  now  or  will  happen  in  the  future  can  disprove  the
hypothesis that the world began five minutes ago. […] I am not here suggesting that the non-
existence of the past should be entertained as a serious hypothesis. Like all skeptical hypotheses,
it is logically tenable but uninteresting” (Russell 1921: 159-60). Peirce would however take such a
fanciful doubt about the existence of the past to be merely a “paper” doubt. The fact that we can
put words done on paper in the form of an interrogatory does not mean that we are genuinely in
doubt. 
19. “Ordinarily change is measured with reference to the permanent and is explained in terms of
the permanent. Thus a change in weather gets explained by reference to the unchanging laws of
air masses. […] But historical change involves one in the paradox of attempting to understand the
discontinuous.  It  seems plain  that  if  there  were  no discontinuous  change there  could  be  no
historical  knowledge as  an independent  sort  of  knowledge”  (Miller:  1981:  187-8).  It  however
seems equally plain that absolute rupture renders historical impossible: bridges between the past
and present must be construct in order for the past, at least in a determinate, intelligible form, to
reached by us who are, at once, bound to the historical present and, principally by virtue of the
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critical resources provided by historical consciousness, possess a limited capacity to transcend
the all too narrow bounds of an insular present (cf. Esposito 1984: Ch. 5). 
20. “A discussion of history does well,” J. W. Miller observes, “to avoid an alienation from natural
science so abrupt that in the end the two interests confront each another as incommunicable. At
the  same  time  one  can  hardly  avoid  differences  that  at  first  do  seem  alienating.  Science
eventuates in formulae. […] History, in contrast, needs acts, agents, dates, places, desires, and
passions. In order to study these, it employs a peculiar sort of material – namely, documents and
monuments” (Miller 1981: 107). History as a distinctive form of experimental inquiry is, at least
in general terms, no different from other forms of such inquiry. But, for the most part, history as
the imaginative reconstruction of the historical past undertaken for the sake of deepening our
consciousness  of  our own historicity  cannot  be assimilated too closely  to  such disciplines  as
physics, chemistry, or even biology. 
21. Miller’s work deserves to be far better known than it is. While he was critical of pragmatism,
especially James’s version of this doctrine, he was, partly through his intellectual kinship with
Royce’s absolute pragmatism, much closer to Peirce than he realized.
22. Here,  too,  Miller’s counsel  is  instructive.  The “action with which one deals  in  history is
always  a  reaction”  (Miller  1981:  191)  or,  since  the  term  is  less  likely  to  have  mechanistic
implications, a response. “We reacted,” Miller notes, “to Pearl Harbor. Perhaps no one knows all
the  factors  of  temper  in  that  reaction  [or  response].  Nor  could  one  say  in  advance  of  the
reaction” just what the reaction or response would be. One [indeed] never knows apart from what
is done at a time and place” (ibid.;  emphasis added). Antecedent conditions do not determine
these responses, however much they might color of influence how rational agents respond to
historical events. No reductionism is intended here. To see Plato’s project as a response to the
crises of the polis does not imply that it is nothing but such a response. In turn, to see Peirce’s
philosophy as a response to the crises generated by Darwin’s theory of evolution does not imply
that it is nothing but such a response. Even so, we understand both thinkers only when we take
with the utmost seriousness the profound crises by which their philosophical projects were, in
part, generated.
23. This implies a distinction between the merely chronological and the truly historical past.
“The chronological past,” J. W. Miller contends, “has no shape. It is all the vents common to all
points of view. The historical  past has shape.  It  is  not a common past.  It  is  peculiar to each
society, for each society has its own past as surely as it has its own present” (Miller 1981: 165). He
adds: “Only the particular present [i.e., the present of us, here and now] has a historical past.
Therefore, the historical past will be as particular as its present extension [or prolongation]”
(ibid.).  To  make  this  concrete,  consider  the  intergenerational  community  of  experimental
scientists with which Peirce so deeply identified (see, e.g., CP 8.101). This is in a sense a society, a
more  or  less  integrated  assemblage  of  distinct  individuals.  Contemporary  members  of  this
specific  society  do  not  claim  just anyone  who  lived  before  them  (i.e.,  who  chronologically
antedates them) as their ancestors.  They would almost certainly see Thales,  Ptolemy, Galileo,
Copernicus, Newton, and countless specific others as their scientific forerunners. 
24. This does not necessarily mean that we transcend history in its entirety or in every sense,
only history taken to be a determinate field of purely objective knowledge.
25. The life of experimental intelligence is as much as anything else an adventure of the human
imagination.  So,  too,  the  evolution  of  historical  consciousness  (or  imagination)  is  such  an
adventure.  There are no doubt distinct  senses of  this  protean term. Peirce goes so far  as  to
suggest, “‘imagination’ is an ocean-broad term, almost meaningless, so many and so diverse are
its species” (Peirce 1966: 255). But the several senses at play in this paper – scientific, historical,
and by implication moral – are distinct, though not incompatible. 
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26. “The past cannot address one,” John William Miller suggests, “in one’s own language. One
must learn the language of the past. It is not accommodating or kind, and can’t be ordered to
make itself clear to one” (Miller 1981: 187; cf. Colapietro 2003).
27. Even here, it is necessary to be cautious. Are we necessarily in a position to know that a
monument constructed millennia ago was not addressed to unknown future generations? 
28. “History is not,” Miller insists, “‘about’ a past; it is [in the present] a disclosure and vehicle of
the past. Except as a career and continuum there is no past to write ‘about.’ And if a career, then
the present has joined and embraced the past” (Miller 1981: 178-9). “The very word ‘politics’ is
Greek, not biblical. Their career is also ours” (Miller 1981: 135). However remote and alien we are
from the ancient Athenians, our political life is in some manner and measure continuous with
theirs. Such dramatic identification is at the bottom of all historical consciousness. Miller goes so
far as to suggest, “what seems analogical is actually a search for identity. We ask, ‘Who were the
[ancient] Romans?’ We [simply in posing this question seriously] join them in self-definition, not
in a technical problem. By knowing themselves better we know ourselves better. We profit not from a
technical skill or failure, but from the common political purpose that is self-disclosing” (ibid.,
emphases added). With regard to history in this sense, “one is here dealing not with analogy, but
in a career. We are together in a career, not as technicians.” In the sense most relevant here,
history is, in other words, a drama in which we are implicated and, as such, one in which the
dramatis personae includes far more than contemporary actors.
29. “In the caves of the Pyrenees there are drawings of a herd of deer. A friend of mine, a lawyer,
who saw them, gave me a quiet but stirring account of his visit. What was it that he saw? A pretty
picture? That would not have prompted his words or his manner. Nor was he commenting on the
degree of intelligence of Neanderthal man. It was, rather, that in those caves something was
revealed. Here was a voice, an utterance, an announcement, not of any matter of fact, but the
presence of men and objects. These drawings were a voice. “Out of the silence a voice, out of the
darkness a light. In the story of chaos from which the world emerged it was the generation of
particulars – earth, sky, vegetation – that brought content and form. I think that my friend felt
he was a spectator of the creation. On what other basis could one find anything [so] awesome in
those drawings? The maker, the poet, saw himself in telling what he saw. He is not represented
there, but presented” (Miller 1981: 103-4).
30. In asking this question, we need not project onto them reflexive or explicit forms of self-
understanding,  only  a  vague  sense  of the  import  or  function  of  their  own  characteristic
endeavors.
31. Our relationship to our language implicates us as inheritors. “We do not come upon a past,”
Miller  insists,  “as  upon  something  new,  extraneous,  or  merely  additional.  To  inherit  one’s
mother tongue is to have spoken and to have heard, to have been addressed and to have attended
to others. Something of the past has [always] already become part of one’s activity. No one begins a
lively  acquaintance  with  objects  or  persons  by studying  history.  One learns  first  to  conduct
oneself  in  ways  that  only  later  on  disclose  their  historical  implications”  (Miller  1981:  179,
emphasis added).
32. In The Sense of an Ending by Julian Barnes, the protagonist muses, “History isn’t the lies of the
victors. I know that now. It’s more the memories of the survivors, most of whom are neither
victorious nor defeated.” This implies that history has never been simply “the record of the high
accomplishments in dominant civilizations” (2011: 61).
33. As already noted, Fisch is here invoking a metaphor found in Christian and Hebrew scripture
(see, e.g., Psalms, 113, 118; Matthew 21, 41; and Mark 12, 10). But it is his use of this metaphor
that is most relevant to this essay, so citing his text seems only apposite.
34. “Unlike his  contemporary,  Karl  Marx,  who sought to explain ‘history in general’  using a
materialistic model that allowed only the most elementary recognition between effects and their
conditions [hence between the ideological superstructure and the economic foundation], Peirce’s
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model,” Esposito suggests, “described history as a vast dialogue of significations and reflections,
continually  shedding  contingencies  and  growing  hyperbolically  in  the  direction  of  greater
concrete reasonableness” (Marx 1983: 65).
35. “The besetting sin of history is,” Miller astutely observes, “anachronism, the description of
any  past  in  the  terms  of  an  abstract  present.  History  writing  that  is  not  the  imaginative
reconstruction of the past on its own terms, indeed the very discovery of such terms, leaves the
past  as  a  mystery  or  else  reduces  it  to  the  ahistoricity  of  scientific  nature,  to  psychological
atomism, or theological incomprehension” (Miller 1981: 186-7).
36. “It is truth well worthy of rumination,” Peirce insists, “that all the intellectual development
of man rests upon the circumstance that all our action is subject to error. Errare est humanum is of
all commonplaces the most familiar” (CP 6.86; cf. W 1: 5). But it might be as profound as it is
familiar.
37. Picking  up  the  thread  from  the  previous  note,  the  most  important  truth  about  human
intelligence is that virtually all of our knowledge is the result of having made mistakes or, more
precisely, flows from the exercise of our ability to proceed erroneously. The capacity to make
mistakes is no mean or ignoble ability. The Peircean doctrine of thoroughgoing fallibilism is itself
the  dramatic  outcome  of  a  historical  development,  the  uncompromising  acceptable  of  our
ineradicable fallibility conjoined to an equally robust faith in our ability to discover novel truths
(see, e.g., CP 1.14). Abandoning the quest for apodictic certainty does not entail losing faith in the
possibility  of  pragmatic  certainty  or  confidence.  But  it  does  require  us  to  acknowledge  that
approximation is the very fabric out of which our philosophy not only has been woven but also
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